Fraud and Insider Trading in American Securities Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace by Langevoort, Donald C.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 16
Number 2 Winter 1993 Article 3
1-1-1993
Fraud and Insider Trading in American Securities
Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global
Marketplace
Donald C. Langevoort
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading in American Securities Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace, 16
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 175 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol16/iss2/3
Fraud and Insider Trading in American
Securities Regulation: Its Scope and
Philosophy in a Global Marketplace
By DONALD C. LANGEVOORT*
I. INTRODUCTION
While American securities regulation is multi-faceted, its most visi-
ble function is controlling fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. In exploring this function, this Article will first offer an
overview of how the law operates with respect to fraud generally and
explore the analytical strategies the law employs regarding insider trad-
ing specifically.' Then, it will look at the underlying philosophy of regu-
lation: What American law is trying to accomplish through its rather
aggressive regulatory posture and why. Finally, it will consider how ap-
propriate this philosophy is when applied to the regulation of multi-na-
tional conduct, where American interests are affected along with those of
other nations.
This last question is exceptionally important in light of the linkages
that have developed among securities markets and the transnational in-
terest existing in the management of investment portfolios.2 A percep-
tion lingers in the United States that the question of extraterritorial fraud
jurisdiction is relatively trivial. The reasoning behind this perception is
that, because fraud is "bad," no nation should seriously object to the
* Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
1. This Article will not address explicitly the express antifraud remedies, e.g., those
found in the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter the Securities Act]. Most of these have built-in
limitations with respect to the globalization issues. For instance, the draconian § 11 liability
for false statements in a registration statement applies only when a registration statement must
be ffled the Securities Exchange Commission [hereinafter the SEC], in its Reg. S and related
initiatives, has expressly narrowed the class of transnational transactions in which registration
is required. Some of what is said here applies by analogy to the express settings, however,
particularly § 12(2), dealing with fraud in prospectuses generally, without regard to
registration.
2. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Mar-
kets: Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERV. R.Es. 349 (1990); U.S.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY (July 1990).
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application of the American antifraud provisions abroad where the result
is simply to remedy such fraud.' As this Article shows, however, this is a
simplistic view.' Properly understood, the antifraud provisions go well
beyond the prohibition of classic forms of deceit or manipulation and
delve into areas where reasonable regulatory minds can and do readily
differ. Implicit conflicts among national regulatory regimes are inevita-
ble. The primary purpose of this Article is to underscore the aspects of
our regulatory philosophy most likely to lead to such conflicts and to
consider how we might begin to resolve some of the forseeable tension.
II. RULE lOb-5
The principal antifraud provision of the securities laws in the United
States is rule 1Ob-5. This rule bars fraud in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security when the facilities of interstate commerce (defined
to include facilities linking the United States and foreign countries) are
used.' Rule lOb-5 covers fraud relating to all securities, from those is-
sued by the largest public corporation to those issued by tiny limited
partnerships and closely held corporations. To commit an actionable
fraud under rule lOb-5, a person need not be engaged in securities trading
(i.e., there is no privity requirement). 6 Rather, fraud consists of (1) mate-
rial misstatements or "half-truths" that are reasonably calculated to in-
fluence the investing public7 and (2) silence when an independent duty to
speak is created by some prior conduct or pre-existing fiduciary relation-
ship. The most important limitation on liability is that the defendant
must have acted with scienter (i.e., some intent to deceive, or reckless-
ness).' The scope of rule lOb-5 is sufficiently broad that aiders and abet-
tors-those who knowingly and substantially assist a primary violation-
are liable as well. This means that banks, law firms, accountants, and
others are exposed regularly to lawsuits.
If undertaken willfully, violations of rule lOb-5 are crimes. The
3. See, eg., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Some Contributions From an
International Lawyer, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 91, 95 (1986).
4. In doing so, this Article builds on another recent work, Donald C. Langevoort,
Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Se-
curities Market, Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 1992).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter the Securities Exchange Act], 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3(a)(17), 10(b).
6. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
7. Id.
8. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see generally James D. Cox, Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact Upon the Scheme of the
Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTING L.J. 569 (1977).
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SEC may also punish via a series of remedies such as civil fines and equi-
table relief. Just as important, American courts assume that persons in-
jured by violations have a right to sue for damages if their harm was
caused by the fraud.9 In large-scale trading, rule lOb-5 violations can
trigger class action lawsuits on behalf of large numbers of investors,
which result in massive dollar awards.10
The Supreme Court case, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,"1 illustrates the
breadth of potential liability. In Basic, a company was involved in
merger negotiations for a transaction that, in management's view, would
be lucrative for the company's shareholders. After information leaked,
stock exchange officials asked the company whether there were any on-
going material events that could explain the abnormal trading activity.
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the negotiations, company offi-
cials denied any knowledge of the negotiations.
When the merger was announced, a class action was brought on
behalf of all of the sellers of company stock between the time of the mis-
representation and the public announcement. Assuming that the negoti-
ations had reached a stage of "materiality" at the time of the denial, the
Court held that the company had indeed violated rule lOb-5, even
though the company's motive in lying was to benefit its shareholders.
Furthermore, according to the Court, damages would extend to all those
who sold during the relevant period, whether or not they actually knew
about, much less relied upon, 2 the company's denial (the so-called
"fraud on the market" theory). Damages could be in the millions of
dollars. Similar lawsuits are commonplace-and often successful-in
cases where companies introduce new products with a burst of exces-
sively optimistic publicity, and the products later turn out to be market
failures.13
9. Courts generally require that the plaintiff show (1) either actual or presumed reliance
on the misstatement or omission and (2) pecuniary loss caused by the fraud. See Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (Sth Cir. 1981), affid on othergraunds, 459 U.S. 375
(1983).
10. Generally, each defrauded buyer or seller may recover the difference between the
transaction price and the price the security would have traded at had the full truth been known
(the "out-of-pocket" measure of damages). See, eg., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
541 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976)(Sneed, J., concurring).
11. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
12. For analyses and critiques of this holding, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Good Financ4 Bad Economics An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990); Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the
Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945 (1991).
13. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Lit., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989). Later, the jury
held the individual defendants liable for some S100 million, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 871
(N.D. Cal., May 30, 1991), but this ruling was in turn vacated by the trial judge.
1993]
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Basic and similar cases provide important insight for American se-
curities regulation. Note the emphasis on honesty above all else. Busi-
ness or shareholder-oriented justifications for misstatements, no matter
how compelling, are not acceptable.14 Scienter is not defined as trying to
harm someone or enriching one's self at another's expense. Rather, it is
enough that one simply misstates or omits facts when one is aware of (or
recklessly disregards) the truth. Also noteworthy are the consequences
of liability. Violations of rule lOb-5 visit serious financial consequences
on corporations and (ironically) non-trading shareholders, often seem-
ingly disproportionate to the level of culpability. The resulting pressure
to settle is substantial.' 5
The philosophy behind these doctrinal choices is not well articlu-
ated. The law under rule lOb-5 is largely the product of the ad hoc judi-
cial decision-making expressed in what now amounts to thousands of
decided cases, rather than a coherent statutory or administrative
pronouncement.
One objective, of course, is to promote informed decision-making by
investors, providing them with relatively-not totally' 6-complete and
accurate information. Yet, it is by no means clear why this truth-telling
value should necessarily override other values of equal if not greater in-
terest to investors, like profit maximization. It seems, then, that these
results reflect something even more embedded in American culture-the
virtue of accountability. Unlike economic systems of many other socie-
ties, 17 the American economic system is relatively fragmented. Large
numbers of enterprises possess dispersed equity ownership. Few are sub-
ject to substantial external control by banks or institutional sharehold-
14. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17; Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 893 F.2d 1405 (1st Cir.
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d 10 (lst Cir. 1990) (en banc).
15. For a study of the pressure to settle in the context of actions under § 11 of the Securi-
ties Act, see Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). Professor Alexander's article suggests that in
§ I 1 cases, settlements are done largely without regard to the underlying merits of the action,
primarily because of pressure from the investment banker defendants. How well this cxperi-
ence can be generalized to rule lOb-5 is not entirely clear, but anecdotally, at least, there Is
abundant evidence that many rule lOb-5 actions are settled to avoid the expense, distraction,
and publicity attendant to the lawsuit.
16. Nothing in rule lob-5 compels a corporation to divulge information to the market-
place simply because it is material. Rather, there must be an independent duty to disclose.
See, e.g., Backman, 910 F.2d at 10. As a result, there is always some body of proprietary data
that is not made available to market participants, and investors must assume the risk that their
choices will turn out to be wrong in light of the withheld information.
17. The cultural differences are usefully explored in Dan F. Henderson, Security Markets
in the United States and Japan: Distinctive Aspects Molded By Cultural, Social Economic and
Political Differences, 14 HASnNGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 263 (1991).
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ers-there is nothing comparable to the keiretsu of Japan or the banker
involvement in Germany as behavioral checks. The belief is that, absent
a strong emphasis on publicity and truth-telling, American business or-
ganizations will exercise their immense economic and political power in
invisible and potentially self-serving ways. Historically, Americans have
been very uncomfortable with this prospect. Thus, the truth-telling re-
gime imposed by rule lOb-5 is valued not only because it operates to
provide information for use by investors, but because of the belief that
the very exposure that it creates, and the resulting need for lawyers, ac-
countants, and other advisers that must be brought in from outside the
corporation to manage the resulting risks, make it more likely that re-
sponsible behavior will occur in the first place.1I
This disciplinary emphasis is particularly evident in the case law
which defines what constitutes material information. American law es-
sentially divides material information into two categories, quantitative
and qualitiative. Quantitative information relates to the issuer's financial
condition; qualititative information relates to the quality of how the
company is being managed. The ill health of the company's top manag-
ers, their compensation packages, their misbehavior, their compliance
with the law, and the like all become subject to public scrutiny under the
truth-telling regime. 19 While some of this information is significant to
basic investment decisions, the broad scope of the law in this area reflects
a more extensive regulatory agenda-the same agenda, for instance, that
introduced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act into American securities
regulation.2'
M. INSIDER TRADING
The American law of insider trading is largely the product of the
courts' interpretation of rule lOb-5. 21 As noted earlier, silence is not ac-
18. While the benefits of publicity cannot be denied, the costs in lawyers' and accountants'
fees and on the freedom to operate flexibly are substantial. A cynic might view the primary
motivation for such a system as flowing not from investors or the public but from the legal and
other service communities, who have substantial influence at the SEC. See Donald C.
Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice4 Institutional Rhetoric and the Process
of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 527, 531-32 (1990).
19. See James D. Cox et al., SEcuRrriEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATEIALS 96-121
(1991).
20. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1978 created greater federal oversight under the
Securities Exchange Act over the asset control function (§ 13(bX2)) and prohibited foreign
bribery (§ 30A). The motivating concern was the discovery of "ofrbooks" slush funds used by
high level managers to further both business and political ends.
21. Statutorily, § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act-which compels reporting of trades
by certain high-level insiders and disgorgement of profits from short-swing trading-is the
19931
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tionable under the rule absent an independent duty to disclose. In
Chiarella v. United States,22 the Supreme Court indicated that such a
duty arises when a company insider trades in that company's common
stock because by definition he or she is dealing with a company share-
holder (or someone who by virtue of the transaction becomes one).
Under common law, a company shareholder is a beneficiary of the in-
sider's fiduciary obligation. Subsequent cases have extended this reason-
ing to persons who are not directors or employees, but who nonetheless
have some fiduciary-like relationship with the company (e.g., attorneys
and investment bankers).2" Liability also extends (under something of a
conspiracy theory) to tippees who receive information from an insider in
a communication which has no business purpose and thus operates as a
self-serving breach of fiduciary duty by the insider.2+ All of this is sub-
sumed under the so-called "abstain or disclose" theory.
When the alleged trading is in a debt security, or when an insider
trades in the security of another issuer (to which he or she has no pre-
existing relationship), a second judicially created theory comes into play.
Applying the "misappropriation" theory, it is fraud under rule lOb-5 to
misuse for personal benefit through securities trading any information
with which one has been entrusted.25 Here, the source of the informa-
tion, usually the defendant's employer, is defrauded rather than other
investors. This was the approach used by prosecutors to prosecute a for-
mer reporter for the Wall Street Journal who bought shares of companies
that he knew would be mentioned favorably in forthcoming columns.26
Finally, the SEC adopted rule 14e-3, which-quite apart from any
only form of control. Today, there is some recognition of the relatively archaic nature of the
disgorgement remedy in light of the fluorishing of rule lOb-5's coverage of insider trading,
although its value is not dismissed entirely. See American Bar Ass'n Report, Task Force on
Regulation of Insider Trading-Part I." Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAW. 1087, 1091 (1987).
22. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. See SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
24. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). This approach to tippee liability also
makes the tipper liable for the tippee's profits. The doctrine is broad enough to reach remote
as well as direct tippees, so long as the remote tippee knows or has reason to know that the
information is tainted by a breach of fiduciary duty. See United States v. Musella, 678 F.
Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
25. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983).
26. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), a/I'd by an equally divided
Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The reporter and his confederates were also convicted under the
federal criminal wire and mail fraud statutes, and the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
conviction on the basis that insider trading is a clear-cut violation of those statutes. See gener-
ally Barbara B. Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 OHIo
ST. L.J. 373 (1988).
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notion of fiduciary duty or entrustment-simply makes it unlawful to
trade while in possession of material information relating to a tender of-
fer (once there has been a substantial step toward its commencement)
when it is (or should be) known that the information came from either
the bidder or the target.27
If an instance of trading or tipping violates the law under any of
these three theories (conspiratorial, abstain or disclose, or misappropria-
tion), criminal prosecution is a distinct possibility. However, the more
frequent enforcement mechanism is an SEC action, which may result in
disgorgement of any profits received plus a civil penalty of up to three
times the amount of profits received or losses avoided. A private class
action is also a possibility, but such actions play a very small role in this
area compared to their more sizeable role in false publicity cases.28
As with the antifraud prohibition generally, the philosophy underly-
ing the American law of insider trading is somewhat difficult to discern.
Although there is no doubt the profits that insiders receive as a result of
illegal trading come from other investors, 9 identifying those harmed is
quite difficult. For most contemporaneous traders in the stock market,
the presence of some insider buying or selling with an informational ad-
vantage does not cause any pecuniary harm. In all likelihood, they
would have traded anyway, at roughly the same price. No doubt the
insight that any harm from insider trading is extremely diffuse has much
to do with the emphasis on public rather than private enforcement. By
restricting the recovery to the amount of a defendant's profits, the rule
strongly suggests that the prevention of unjust enrichment is the primary
objective of the substantive law.
Admittedly, various other arguments in favor of prohibiting insider
trading are often made. The prohibition operates to remove both a disin-
centive to prompt corporate disclosure and an incentive to manipulate
corporate affairs in order to produce a volatile stock price."0 It also is a
means of assuring that executive compensation is open and controlled,
27. Rule 14e-3's validity was upheld in United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1991)(en bane).
28. Pursuant to § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, added to the law in 1988, class
actions by contemporaneous traders are authorized against traders and tippers, but the most
they can recover is the amount of the defendants' profits, and even that sum is reduced by any
amounts already disgorged in an SEC proceeding. The statute expressly leaves open the possi-
bility that other types of injury (e.g., to the source of the information in a misappropriation
case) can be compensated in an implied right of action under rule lOb-5.
29. See William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Ruk iOb-5?, 54 S. CAL
L. REV. 1217 (1981).
30. This seems to be an intent behind the statutory form of insider trading regulation,
19931
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not secret and episodic.31 But, just as in rule lOb-5 generally, there is
something more ideological as well. A strong streak of egalitarianism
and obsession with the appearance of fair play leads many Americans to
demand the removal of the more visible, excisable advantages attaching
to employment, family status, or cultivated friendships that might be put
to use in our supposedly fair and open markets. The "abstain or dis-
close" theory, at least, affirms the view that managers are supposed to
work for shareholders. No one is seriously under the illusion that all
investors have a right to complete informational equality, but at the same
time there is the desire to remove those inequalities that do not seem to
be a necessary incident to our system of business enterprise. Under this
view, insiders should be content with their paychecks and not overreach
for profits. That this smacks a bit of populism, of envy and resentment
directed at the privileges of class and wealth, is hard to deny. But appeal
to populism is a recurrent theme in American economic history.3 2
IV. EXPORTING AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TO A
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
The foregoing should amply demonstrate that American securities
regulation reflects substantive philosophical choices that are deeply em-
bedded in our unique economic culture. The emphasis on truth-telling
and fair play, the distrust of concentrated economic power, and the
unease (while at the same time fascination) with privilege and status have
all influenced the adoption of specific doctrinal principles in our law of
fraud. It follows, of course, that other nations whose cultures reflect dif-
ferent values-or which have different social or economic mechanisms
for accomplishing similar goals-will find our approach to the definition
§ 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating
the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1991),
31. For various views on these and other related objectives, see James D. Cox, Insider
Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School", 1986 DuKV. L.J. 628; R.
CLARK, CoRPoRATE LAW 274-75 (1986); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regu-
lation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to
Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTrRA L. RIV. 9
(1984).
32. For an illustration of the popular outrage as expressed in Congress, see the remarks of
Rep. John Dingell, 134 CONG. RFc. H7469 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988), who compared well-
known trader Ivan Boesky to Icarus of Greek mythology, whose hubris caused him to fly on
waxen wings toward the sun. Others have expressed the view that insider trading regulation in
the United States is an example of special interest legislation at the behest of the investment
banking and securities industries. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coaslan
Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 1449 (1986).
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and sanction of lying in the securities context, both foreign and trouble-
some. This is the source of the implicit legal conflicts noted at the outset.
In a globalized securities market, where trading is fragmented in
multiple markets and investor classes are multinational, the opportunity
to impose the American antifraud philosophy is immense. In this sec-
tion, we shall look at how American courts deal with the question of the
extraterritorial application of rule lOb-5. There are two tests: one based
on effects, the other based on conduct.
A. The Effects Test
It is now well established that rule lOb-5 can be applied to any
fraudulent conduct that, although occurring abroad, causes significant
adverse effects to investors or markets in the United States.33 Simply to
state this principle of subject matter jurisdiction demonstrates its
breadth. If Americans invest in the most significant business enterprises
world-wide and the securities or depository receipts of most large mul-
tinational corporations are traded in American markets, then it is diffi-
cult to imagine that misinformation placed into the world-wide
information pool could not potentially trigger American jurisdiction, so
long as the facilities of interstate commerce are somehow utilized in con-
nection with the transaction. The Basic case, discussed earlier, provides
a good example. If a Japanese company was engaged in an acquisition
negotiation and falsely denied it, jurisdiction could be triggered if the
shares were traded in New York, or (possibly) even if Tokyo was the sole
trading site but a significant number of sellers were based in the United
States. 34
The law of insider trading presents even more intriguing situations.
It is the case, of course, that foreigners who trade improperly in Ameri-
can markets while in possession of inside information are subject to
American jurisdiction, even if the trades were initiated through brokers
abroad. Although most of the cases that have been brought thus far have
33. The most significant statement of this principle is found in Schoenbaurn v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968Xen banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
34. The Schoenbaum case emphasized that being listed on an American exchange was an
important factor in the exercise of American jurisdiction. In theory, however, there is nothing
in the effects test that would necessarily limit it to the listing situation. Whether the simple
fact that a large number of tainted investment decisions occurred here is enough to justify the
exercise ofjurisdiction, however, is an open question. In Leasco Data Processing Equip. Co. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), the court determined that a foreign purchase initated
abroad by an American-owned company did not trigger jurisdiction. See also MCG Inc. v.
Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1990).
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involved either American-based issuers or misappropriation from Ameri-
can-based firms, it will only be a matter of time before the connections
become more remote.35
For example, consider a situation where a Japanese citizen trades in
the shares of IBM, an American-based company that happens to be listed
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, based on information learned during an
American executive's trip to Tokyo.36 American jurisdiction could still
be justified on one of two bases. First, the company whose shares were
traded was American, so in the American way of thinking, its intangible
property was misappropriated. Second, IBM is also traded in the United
States, and many Americans are investors. Assuming that the tip wtis
tainted, the breach of the fiduciary duty of full disclosure, in theory,
could be extended to all investors, wherever they were trading. Conceiv-
ably, the same logic could apply even if the issuer were Japanese as long
as its shares were traded in the United States.
These conclusions are not inevitable, of course; respectable counter-
arguments can be made, especially in the latter case. For instance,
American courts might conclude that the harm associated with insider
trading is truly inchoate and thus better dealt with by assuming that it is
a harm only on the market where the trading occurs. But until the issue
is addressed by the courts, at least the potential for such a broad extrater-
ritorial reach remains.
B. The Conduct Test
The alternative mechanism for finding jurisdiction is the conduct
test." Significant conduct in the United States will suffice to trigger ju-
risdiction even if the harm is visited solely on foreign investors. Ameri-
35. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT
AND PREVENTION § 14.03 (1991). For a suggestion that the extraterritorial scope of the law
should be quite broad, see Ronald B. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation
of Insider Trading, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 375, 403-07.
36. To make the problem more difficult, one might assume that the tip or trade was illegal
in the United States but legal in Japan. While the new Japanese regulatory scheme is quite
thorough, there are a number of instances where it does not make conduct illegal that would
be illegal in the United States. See Shen-Shin Lu, Japanese Regulation ofInsider Trading, 24
REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 133 (July 1991). See also K. OKAMURA & C. TAKESHITA, LAW
AND REGULATION RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN (1989); Tomoko Okashi, Note,
Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (1989). By way of example,
under the Japanese regulatory system, there is no effort to reach the misappropriation of infor-
mation outside the traditional insider context; there is no effort to reach recipients of confiden-
tial information except "primary tippees;" and the list of information that can be deemed
material is limited and well-defined, not open-ended as it is in the U.S.
37. See, eg., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987); SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
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can courts are somewhat divided on how much conduct must occur in
the United States-whether it is any significant conduct or whether the
constituent elements of fraud must have occurred here. In any event,
there is the possibility that trips to the United States during which an
investment is discussed 38 and/or the use of American professionals (ac-
countants, law firms, etc.) or American markets could trigger the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.39
Like the effects test, the conduct test is potentially broad. In an
electronically linked marketplace and an age of easy cross-border travel,
claiming jurisdiction on the presence of some U.S.-based conduct could
gradually become easier (i.e., more transactions will have some U.S.
link). On the other hand, there is also the significant possibility that hon-
est business people will consciously steer away from American contacts
to minimize the risk of U.S. jurisdiction, thus placing American securi-
ties and related firms at a competitive disadvantage.
C. Is There an Alternative?
While there are hints of discomfort in the United States with the
potential overbreadth of our extraterritorial application of rule 10b-5 and
the law of insider trading,4' little is likely to change as long as we adhere
to the notion that American law will apply in a protective manner
roughly coextensive with the interests of American investors. In today's
globalized markets, American investors can be defrauded, according to
the American definition of the term, by a variety of sources worldwide.
While its protective virtue from an American standpoint is undenia-
ble, the problem with this approach is two-fold. First, it imposes a phi-
losophy unique to American culture in foreign settings. Therefore, there
is strong potential for the violation of a sense of comity. Second, to the
extent that similar jurisdictional claims could be made by other nations,
there is strong potential for multiple, overlapping standards of conduct
being applied to the same transactions, substantially burdening the
processes of planning and dispute resolution with duplication and
38. See AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.
1984); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983).
39. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983Xcommodities law).
40. Most notably, a greater emphasis on comity is reflected in the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 401,416 (1986); see Har-
old G. Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or "There and Back Again", 25 VA. J. INT'L
L. 7 (1984). In the academic and practitioner literature, there is a similar call for restraint.
See, eg., Barbara S. Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of the United States Securities Laws
The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CoRP. L. 189 (1982); Note, Predictability and Comity:
Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HAv. L REv. 1310 (1985).
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uncertainty. 41
Conceptually, there is really only one alternative. The United States
should move towards a world-wide understanding whereby subject mat-
ter jurisdiction-at least regarding corporate disclosure policy-is based
not on the alleged violation's impact but on its source.42 The conse-
quences of issuer misrepresentation or nondisclosure with respect to sec-
ondary marketplace trading would be set presumptively by the country
with the strongest claim over the issuer of the securities. Investors would
be told clearly that, when making an investment in a foreign-based issuer,
they will be left largely to the antifraud remedies and enforcement mech-
anisms provided by the home country. Presumably, investors will avoid
or demand a risk premium for investment in countries that do not have
an efficient protective mechanism.
I do not mean to suggest that we will, or should, move completely to
such a system. The United States would never be comfortable leaving
American investors completely without remedy in cases of blatant frauds
initiated abroad but directed here. But there are steps short of complete
effects-based jurisdiction that could operate as effective compromises.
The new multi-jurisdictional disclosure system begun by the SEC is a
possible model.43 Deference to foreign antifraud law could be based on
some threshold judgment as to its adequacy and/or reciprocity. Substan-
tive compromises are also possible. For example, effects-based jurisdic-
tion could be limited to core forms of fraud and manipulation, where
corruption is clear and implicit regulatory conflicts axe unlikely. While I
do not wish to understate the definitional difficulties of building such a
system, it does seem to be the only alternative to conflict and overlap.
Importantly, deference to the law of the site of incorporation is already
the prevailing choice of law approach in corporate law and the primary
source of post-purchase investor protection.
41. See Mary K. Kane, Dispute Resolution in the United States: Concerns and Opportuni-
ties in an Era of Globalization of Securities Markets, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 405
(1991).
42. For a call for such an emphasis in tender offer regulation, see Arthur R. Pinto, The
Internationalization of the Hostile Takeover Market: Its Implications for Choice of Law In Cor-
porate and Securities Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 55 (1990). Under this approach, there would
still be plenary regulatory authority over broker-dealers and investment advisers who have
U.S.-based customers and who are often the primary source of information (or misinforma-
tion) about foreign issuers.
43. As recently adopted with respect to Canada, disclosure documents qualified under
Canadian law will be acceptable for use in the United States. See Securities Act Rel, No. 6902,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,812 (June 21, 1991). However, under this new system-which
no doubt will be extended to other countries-antifraud regulation remains completely
Americanized.
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V. CONCLUSION
Since we are at a relatively early stage in the globalization process, it
is too early to say precisely how strong the potential for implicit conflict
in antifraud regulation really is. Maybe the American courts will come
to embrace comity as a value and place self-imposed limits on the exer-
cise of jurisdiction, largely obviating the concern. If not, however, this
field will be increasingly problematic, and there will be growing pressure
to search for other strategies.
Over time, it is possible that the cultural differences among nations
that affect the process of securities regulation may erode sufficiently so
that true harmonization of regulatory approaches will be realistic. In the
meantime, however, regulatory conflict or regulatory cooperation are the
only possibilities. In the end, any dispassionate look at the relative costs
and benefits associated with each of the two possibilities will make clear
that the latter is preferable,' even if it involves abandoning some claim
to the protection of domestic interests.
44. Besides the points made earlier, there is a growing awareness that a sensible system of
international securities enforcement requires cooperation, information sharing, and investiga-
tory assistance among national regulators. For a cooperative system to evolve, there must be
some incentive for nations to provide adequate resources to the task of securities regulation
and to look at the process in terms of mutual interest. Those conditions are undercut by an
American approach that implicitly assumes the inferiority of other regulatory systems.
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